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Abstract: The central coherence involves the processes of perceptual coding and attention 
mechanisms, highly deficient in children with ADHD (Booth & Happé, 2010). According 
to this theory, also children with autism are overly focused on details to the expense of a 
global  perspective,  and  this  negatively  affects  their  ability  to  integrate  environmental 
stimuli into a coherent whole (Happé, Booth, Charlton, Hughes, 2006). The aim of this 
study was to determine differences in central coherence of children with high functioning 
autism (ASD; n=10), children with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; n=10) 
and typically developing peers (n=10). Individuals with ADHD exhibit significant deficits 
in perceptual skills and problem solving, failing also in mental states understanding tasks. 
While the children with autism spectrum disorder show impairments in making pragmatic 
inferences.  Future  research  should  therefore  concentrate  on  the  investigation  of  the 
cognitive and psychological mechanisms underlying these effects.  
Keywords:  Weak  central  coherence,  Autism  spectrum  disorder,  Attention-deficit  hyperactivity  disorder, 
Perceptual skill, Pragmatic inference, Mental states understanding. 
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1. INTRODUCTION   
The  central  procedures  of  information  processing  are  typically 
characterized by the drive for "coherence", which allows giving a meaning 
to experiences, placing them in a broader context (Frith & Happé, 1994). 
The  cognitive  flexibility/shifting  and  response  selection/inhibition 
(Mackinlay,  Charman,  &  Karmiloff-Smith,  2006;  Miyake,  Friedman, 
Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, Wager, 2000) represent different mechanisms 
likely  to  be  started  to  support  people  establish  goals  and  find  different 
strategic solutions for attaining individual objectives, adapting answers  to 
events.  Although  several  abilities  are  not  usually  engaged  during  the 
execution of automatic or semi-automatic sequences, they are critical for 
unknown and inexperienced situations that need high levels of attention and 
a flexible use of goal-oriented strategies. The attention is one of the most 
important  cognitive  processes  that  allow  understanding  the  stimulus 
meaning  within  the  context  (Buckley,  2003;  Wilson  &  Sperber,  1988). 
Specifically,  the  processes  of  selective  attention  permit  to  isolate  the 
important features of stimuli, both perceptual and semantic, that come from 
outside, ignoring those less salient. 
At this regard, it has been argued that the process of central coherence 
assigned  to  organization  of  information  allows  individuals  to  give 
priority to understanding meaning, and to comprehend the context in which 
events  occur.  So,  in  a  phrase  it  is  possible  to  grasp  the  meaning  of  the 
message, which is remembered even better if it can be placed in a wider 
context (Vulchanova, Talcott, Vulchanov, & Stankova, 2012). 
But, whereas several studies (Brock, Norbury, Einav, & Nation, 2008) 
have demonstrated that the ability to use context in language comprehension 
is positively related to structural language competence, most recent findings 
(Volden,  Coolican,  Garon,  White,  &  Bryson,  2009)  suggested  that  the 
impact of structural language measures can justify a significant variance in 
pragmatic skills. 
The pragmatics of communication refers to the ways in which context 
contributes to meaning. Specifically, the meaning of a sentence depends on 
an understanding of the context and the speaker's intent. To pay attention to 
the influence that a given context can have on the message is one of the 
ability more involved in the pragmatic inference process, addressed to the 
understanding of the explicit and implicit meaning of the same sentence 
(Loukusa & Moilanen, 2009). 
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coherence  (reading  for  meaning  vs  reading  for  sound)  and  processing 
preference  (local  or  global)  in  visual-spatial  and  constructive  tasks  (e.g. 
Embedded Figures Test and Block Design) have been used to successfully 
explain  how  some  aspects  of  perceptual  organization  can  be  referred  to 
more specific research areas, such as semantic studies.  
At this regard, the Weak Central Coherence hypothesis (WCC) (Frith 
& Happé, 1994; Happé & Frith, 2006) offers an explanatory approach for 
enclosing  behavioral  and  cognitive  dissociations  associated  with  ASD. 
Specifically, many researchers have defined the distinct cognitive profile in 
children with autism, characterized by a fragmented perceptual–cognitive 
style that enhances ability to detect details in a stimulus and difﬁculties in 
integrating information into a coherent whole (Baron-Cohen & Klin, 2006; 
Landry & Bryson, 2004). This limited ability to understand context or to 
"see the big picture" drives individuals with autism spectrum disorders to 
have a tendency for fragmented perception, and to benefit less from the 
contextual  meaning  in  perceptual  or  verbal-semantic  and  global-local 
processing tasks (Dakin & Frith 2005).  
This  detailed  processing  is  suggestive  of  a  weak  central  coherence 
(Frith  &  Happè,  1994).  Thus,  the  WCC  model  is  based  on  a  cognitive 
abnormality  that  affects  a  wide  range  of  psychological  functions: 
perception,  language  and  social  skills.  Individuals  with  autism  spectrum 
disorders tend to process information "piece by piece", rather than in their 
global  context,  focusing  on  the  development  of  its  component  parts. 
Consequently, the information obtained are isolated and fragmented, due to 
a "weak" capacity of central coherence. 
Furthermore, recent studies (Mundy & Jarrold, 2010) have suggested 
that the Weak Central Coherence could also explain social impairments in 
autism spectrum disorders. At this regard, deficits in both responding to 
others’  joint  attention  directives  and  initiating  joint  attention  have  been 
noted  in  children  with  ASD.  These  impaired  joint  attention 
behaviors, which require taking  into  account  oneself  and  the  others,  are 
evident very early and persist over the years. In addition, a specific delay in 
one of the critical precursors of ToM, and, specifically, the ability to process 
an environmental stimulus within the context in which it occurs, negatively 
affects  the  typical  development  of  Theory  of  Mind  (Chevallier,  Noveck, 
Happé, & Wilson, 2011). Therefore, the two models, Central Coherence and 
ToM,  seem  to  be  closely  related  and  have  particularly  important  role in 
helping  children  to  understand the experiences  and  for  improving  their 
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An  interesting  conceptualization  of  the  Weak  Central  Coherence 
model  (Mottron  &  Burack,  2006),  rather  than  focusing    primarily  on 
perceptual deficits, suggests a superior attention to detail in the environment 
to  the  exclusion  of  overall  understanding  of  context.  From  this  point  of 
view, the savant skills in individuals with ASD could be explained by their 
intense focus on little details, their differences in processing and perception, 
and tendencies of obsessive and repetitive behaviors. 
More in depth, in a recent research overview, Happé and Frith (2006) 
have argued that the Weak Central Coherence refers to the detail-focused 
processing  style.  While  the  initial explanation was  consistent  with  the 
presence  of  a  core deficit  in  central  processing  resulting 
in failure to extract global form and meaning, recently different and more 
interesting  interpretations  of  this  cognitive  process  have  been  provided. 
First, the cognitive failure could be explained by a possible superiority in 
local or detail-focused processing rather than a central processing deficit 
(Soulieres, Zeffiro, Girard, & Mottron, 2011). Second, the lack of coherence 
might not be necessary a deficit but it could be an atypical processing style. 
In fact, in ASD, the local bias is not the only processing mode available, 
although  it  might  be  the  default,  and  a  more  holistic  processing  is  also 
possible when patients are well instructed (Davis & Plaisted, 2007). Last, 
the Weak Central Coherence may occur simultaneously to deficits in social 
cognition, rather than explains them.  
So, many studies (Frith & Happè, 1994) have sustained the central 
coherence hypothesis as an atypical local processing in ASD, at the expense 
of  a  weak  processing  at  a  more  central  level.  Furthermore,  the  local 
processing  style  does  not  seem  to  be  a  simple  negative  consequence  of 
executive dysfunction, but rather it appears to be strongly independent from 
ToM deficits.  
The  Weak  Central  Coherence  model  suggests,  therefore,  that  the 
cognitive  functioning,  in  individuals  with  autism  spectrum  disorders,  is 
based  on  the  processing  of  contextual  data  and,  specifically,  of  social 
information (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 2001). As consequence, the limited 
ability to reach a central coherence leads people with autism to experience 
the  world  in  a  fragmented  way,  and  this  processing  style  could  have  a 
crucial role in their poor understanding of social stimuli and meaning.   
Moreover,  full  development  of  mentalizing  abilities  ensures  a 
cohesive  interpretive  device  of  contextual  information,  and  plays  a 
significant role in central coherence improvement. Specifically, the ability 
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sources into a pattern which has meaning. Individuals with ASD can show 
impaired  mentalizing  capacities  due  to  a  specific  deficit  on  integrating 
information at different levels, and this can explain certain ASD symptoms 
and clinical characteristics (Frith & Happè, 1994). 
Nevertheless,  it  also  true  that  difficulties  in  shifting  from  local  to 
global  could  also  represent  a  side-effect  of  an  executive  function  deficit 
(Harris & Leevers, 2000; Rinehart, Bradshaw, Moss, Brereton, & Tonge, 
2000).  In  addition,  as  is  well  known,  executive  dysfunction  can  impair 
communication  ability.  Specifically,  individuals  with  ASD  may  find 
difficult to start and maintain a conversation, interpreting utterances in an 
appropriate  way,  and  also  the  formulation  of  an  appropriate  language, 
through intuitive knowledge of others’ mental states and by reading related 
contextual cues, may be weakened in these patients. Therefore, the problem 
solving  skills  appear  closely  linked  to  executive  functions,  because  they 
allow individuals to process information within the context and understand 
the  mental  states  of  interaction  partners.  The  most  commonly  suggested 
explanations for pragmatic inference deficits are theory of mind and central 
coherence (Loukusa & Moilanen, 2009). 
This  is  also  important  for  children  with  ADHD.  Impulse  control 
problems are common in individuals with ADHD and may include difficulty 
to inappropriate response inhibition. Moreover, they tend to overly focus on 
the detail and fail to grasp the whole picture, and the cognitive perseveration 
does  not  allow  them  to  maintain  attention  and  concentration  on  task 
(Solomon, Ozonoff, Cummings, & Carter, 2008). In addition, they, which 
usually  manifest  lack  of  executive  control,  may  exhibit  difficulty  on 
processing the stimuli, due to the marked inattention/impulsivity and the 
inability  to  attribute  mental  states  to  others  for  the  incapacity  to  remain 
"attached" to the context.  
Despite the considerable amount of literature has clearly demonstrated 
severe executive deficits in both disorders, they are characterized by two 
different ways of directing attention to stimuli: overselectivity in children 
with ASD and inattention /impulsivity in children with ADHD. Usually, 
children with autism show inflexible and overselective behaviors, and also 
hyper-reaction  to  modification  of  routines  characterizes  their  behavioral 
patterns (Fabio, Oliva, & Murdaca, 2011; Lam, Bodfish, & Piven, 2008).  
Moreover,  planning  and  cognitive  flexibility  are  significantly  reduced  in 
individuals with ASD (Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999), which tend to involve in 
highly  perseverative  strategies  on  cognitive  flexibility  tasks  (Hughes, 
Russell,  &  Robbins,  1994).    Comparing  to  ASD,  subjects  with  ADHD 6  FILIPPELLO P., MARINO F. ET AL. 
display  more  severe  deficits  of  inhibitory  control,  and  the  response 
inhibition deficits cause and maintain their impulsive behaviors in everyday 
life (Solomon et al., 2008).  
So,  the  focus  of  the  present  investigation  rests  on  these  different 
clinical  profiles  (ASD  vs.  ADHD).  For  the  first  time,  we  explore  the 
possible  impact  of  these  two  different  attentive  models  on  the  ability  to 
direct selective attention to relevant contextual stimuli and to analyze them 
according to the context intent. 
While  there  is  widespread  agreement  on  a  general  description  of 
executive functions, controversial data are been recorded comparing Weak 
Central Coherence and ToM performances of different clinical populations 
that show an impairment in these specific cognitive abilities. This aspect 
needs to be more examined, verifying whether the two different cognitive 
constructs are related or they follow different developmental trajectories. In 
addition,  most  of  the  studies  on  WCC  have  focused  attention  on  the 
perceptual  aspects.  According  to  this  framework,  the  Central  Coherence 
refers to the ability to collect stimuli from the context into a coherent whole, 
reserving a secondary role to the ability to grasp the meaning of the actions 
taking place in the context.  
Starting from these theoretical premises, in the present research we 
explored  ASD  and  ADHD  children's  ability  to  process  contextual 
information through perceptual organization and semantic inference tasks. 
While in previous research (Booth & Happè, 2010) exclusively perceptual 
tasks have been used to measure central coherence in autistic samples, in 
this study perceptual and semantic tasks have been introduced for evaluating 
the central coherence level, considering both capacities as essential to the 
overall  organization  of  the  context  and  for  understanding  contextual 
information meaning. A second, perhaps even more important, novel aspect 
of the present investigation is to analyze the ability to use the context for 
story  completion  task  that  implies  the  attribution  of  mental  states  to  the 
protagonist  of  the  story.  More  in  depth,  the  aim  of  this  study  was  to 
investigate the nature of central coherence in children with high functioning 
autism, children with ADHD and typically developing peers, in order to 
verify  which  of  the  two  different  impairments,  overselectivity  or 
impulsivity,  may  have  a  greater  impact  on  the  ability  to  organize  and 
process information. 
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2. METHOD  
2.1 Participants  
Thirty individuals participated in the study, 10 diagnosed with autistic 
spectrum  disorder,  10  affected  by  ADHD,  and  10  typically  developing 
controls. The first group included 10 high functioning children with autism 
ranging from 6 to 12 years (M = 8.25; SD = 2.44). They will hereby be 
referred to as the group of children with autistic spectrum disorders (ASD). 
Children  with  ASD  were  diagnosed  according  to  the  DSM-IV-TR 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria for autism. IQ scores were 
measured with the WISC-III (Wechsler, 1991 – Italian version) (see Table 
1). In addition, symptom profile of the participants in the ASD group was 
measured  using  the  Childhood  Autism  Rating  Scale  (Schopler,  Reichler, 
DeVellis, & Daly, 1980). 
Total scores range from 15 to 60. A score of 30 represents the cutoff 
for a diagnosis of autism on the mild end of the autism spectrum. In the 
present study a mean of 35.46 emerged (SD=1.74) which corresponds to 
mild to moderate levels of autism. 
The  Attention-Deﬁcit/Hyperactivity  Disorder  (ADHD)  group 
comprised 10 children, aged from 6 to 13 years (M= 8.34; SD= 1.62), with a 
formal diagnosis of ADHD based on DSM-IV-TR criteria and a normally 
ranged Full Scale IQ score (see Table 1). ADHD participants were included 
immediately after their first clinical diagnosis and had thus not received any 
pharmacological or psychoeducational therapy before.  
The  typically  developing  (TD)  comparison  group  comprised  10  IQ 
matched neurotypical children (see Table 1), recruited from two different 
schools. They were engaged via local primary schools and they all attended 
normal classes corresponding to their age level schools and were free of 
psychiatric disorders at the time of testing. They were chosen on the basis of 
their age and IQ scores. 
Experimental children were recruited from two different rehabilitation 
centres  operating  in  the  area  of  the  city  of  Messina.  Only  participants 
without  comorbidity  of  behavioural  disorders,  learning  impairments,  and 
mental retardation were included. Potential autistic subjects were excluded 
if found to have an associated neurological, genetic, infectious, or metabolic 
disorder such as fragile X syndrome, encephalitis, or other known medical 
conditions associated. 
There were no significant differences between the autism, ADHD, and 
control  groups  with  respect  to  age,  educational  level,  and  IQ  levels.  All 8  FILIPPELLO P., MARINO F. ET AL. 
participants were native Italian speakers. Each child was individually tested 
and  informed  about  the  procedure  of  the  experiment.  Parental  informed 
consent was obtained for all subjects and the experimental procedure was 
approved by the local ethics committee. 
 
2.2 Measures and procedure 
 
2.2.1  Perceptual skill task 
For assessment of perceptual abilities, Raven’s Colored Progressive 
Matrices  (Raven,  1998)  and  Objects  Assembly  subtest  of  WISC  III  R 
(Wechsler, 2006) were used. In this study, it was administered only a part of 
the CPM (Series: A1-A4-A8-A12- Ab1- Ab4- Ab8- Ab12- B1 -B4- B8- 
B12),  progressing  to  increased  levels of complexity.  That  is  because 
children with ASD and ADHD might have more trouble with tasks that 
require a high attention level, so as to invalidate the results. For the Objects 
Assembly subtest of WISC III R, the child must analyze the picture (an 
apple, a car, a girl and a child face) and construct the whole visual object 
from its parts within time constraints.  
Two  specially  created  tools  namely,  Pragmatic  Inference  Test 
(Filippello & Marino, unpublished results) and Mental-states Test (children 
version)  (Filippello  &  Marino,  unpublished  results)  were  constructed  to 
assess semantic competences.  
 
2.2.2  Pragmatic inference task 
The  Pragmatic  Inference  Test  measures  the  semantic  aspect  of 
cognitive coherence. It was specially structured to evaluate the ability to 
connect two events, using the context to infer the missing information. The 
test  has  been  previously  validated  by  administering  to  a  sample  of  200 
typically  developing  children  ranging  in  age  from  4  to  5  years  (M=4.5, 
SD=.70)  and  its  coefficient  alpha  was  good  (α=  .79),  demonstrating 
very good psychometric properties. The pragmatic inference task consists of 
a short description of pragmatic inference and 8 short everyday stories in 
which there are described a started event and a subsequent situation cause-
related to the event previously mentioned. Each time, after reading one of 
the eight short stories, participants were instructed to respond to about each 
story. They were asked to tell to the researcher the cause explicitly and 
logically  linked  to  the  event  mentioned  in  the  started  situation  [e.g.: 
Someone gives a candy to Louis - The enclosure of the candy is dropped. (a) 
Louis threw the enclosure on the floor. (b) Louis ate the candy (??)]. Verbal MJCP, WCC AND MENTAL STATES UNDERSTANDING    9 
responses were recorded on paper and the accuracy of each response was 
rated on a 1–3 scale by a researcher: 1 for a not given answer, 2 for an 
incorrect answer, and 3 for a fully correct answer. A maximum score of 24 
was  therefore  possible.  Higher  scores  indicate  more  pragmatic  inference 
abilities.  
2.2.3  Mental-states understanding task 
The  Mental-states  Test  (children  version)  evaluates  the  children 
understanding of psychological states in certain contexts and the ability to 
complete  the  description  of  story  fragments  using  the  context.  Although 
there are good tools designed to assess the ToM ability (Blijd-Hoogewys, 
van Geert, Serra, & Minderaa, 2008), none of these is structured in such a 
way as to ensure that the responses of the child to be guided by the context. 
Even this test has been previously validated by administering to a sample of 
200 children with typical development ranging in age from 4 to 5 years 
(M=4.5,  SD=.70).  The  results  showed  that  the  instrument  has  excellent 
psychometric  properties  of  validity  and  reliability  in  measuring  the 
understanding of psychological states corresponding to specific context [α 
=.84].  It is a task (purely semantic) consists of a single story, composed of 
40 chronologically connected events, in which the protagonist (a boy named 
Marco) carries out several everyday activities. Although the story unfolds as 
the day progressed (morning, time at school, afternoon and evening), in this 
study it is preferred to use a shortened version of the test (22 slides rather 
than 44), so only morning and school time were selected for the assessment. 
Each piece of story is represented by a picture that describes the initial state 
of  the  protagonist  and  two  other  drawings  depicting  the  two  possible 
response options. It was possible to choose between two different response 
options: one was consistent with both the protagonist’s mental state and the 
context (correct choice), the other one was reliable with the mental state but 
not with the context (incorrect choice) (see Figure 1). The sequence (correct 
or incorrect) of responses presented was randomized. It was preferred to 
restrict the choice of two possible responses in order to analyze the children 
ability to use the context for successfully completing each piece of history. 
For describing the events, it was used terms relating to five mental states. 
The five types of mental states considered were: the epistemic state (e.g., he 
opens  your  eyes  and  thinks,  imagines,  remembers,  pretends,  etc);  the 
decisional state (e.g., he decides), the emotional one  (e.g., he is happy, 
angry, sad, fear, etc.); the physical state (e.g., he snorts, claps his hands, 
pouts, jumps on the bed, etc.) and the motivational state (e.g., he expects, 
wants, hopes, wishes, demands etc.). The accuracy of each response was 10  FILIPPELLO P., MARINO F. ET AL. 
rated on a 1–2 scale: 1 for an incorrect answer, 2 for correct answer. A total 
maximum score of 44 was therefore possible. Higher scores indicate more 
understanding of psychological states abilities. 
 
Figure 1 
Example of mental-states understanding task. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Study data were analyzed  using SPSS (Statistical  Package for  Social 
Sciences) 17.0 for Windows.  
A  3  (group:  ASD,  ADHD  and  control  group)  X  4  (type  of  task: 
CPM/12,  Object  Assembly  test,  Mental  States  understanding  Test, 
Pragmatic Inference Test) between-subjects design was used. 
The  signiﬁcance  of  differences  in  all  dependent  variables  between 
groups was also determined using independent t-tests. Therefore, Pearson 
correlations  were  run  to  examine  the  relationship  among  the  variables 
involved in the analyses. A .05 significance level was allocated in all tests. MJCP, WCC AND MENTAL STATES UNDERSTANDING    11 
Raw data, as it was relative frequencies, has been transformed into sin
-1 
(Freeman & Tukey, 1950). 
Table 1 reports means and standard deviations of Colored Progressive 
Matrices, Object Assembly subtest, Mental States and Pragmatic Inference 
scores, obtained by three groups. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for developmental and study variables. 
  Autism     ADHD    Typical 
  M     SD    M    SD    M    SD 
Developmental 
level 
                     
Chronological age  8.25    2.44    8.34    1.62    8.33    1.91 
Full Scale IQ  87.03    7.57    87.52    10.79    89.03    5.92 
 
CPM  1.05    .30    .68    .22    1.20    .15 
Object Assembly  1.07    .34    .52    .30    1.20    .10 
Pragmatic Inference 
making  
.87    .42    .94    .17    1.47    .11 
Mental  states 
understanding 
1.37    .25    1.11    .35    1.57    .00 
 
 
The factor ‘‘groups’’ shows significant effects (F2,27=12.009, p <.001). 
Typically  developing  children  reach  higher  levels  of  performance  in  all 
presented  tasks  compared  to  their  peers  in  atypical  development.  
Specifically, while the ADHD group performing overall more poorly than 
both other groups, the ASD group generally failed the Pragmatic inference 
test. 
The  factor  ‘‘type  of  tasks”      has  significant  effects  (F3,81=17.44,  p 
<.001). This means that there are differences among the understanding and 
learning of the different cognitive tasks. 
Lastly, a significant ‘‘groups x type of tasks” interaction was found   
(F6,81=8.07, p < .05), indicating that children with autism and ADHD group 
had  notable  difficulties  selecting  correct  answers;  in  fact,  they  were 
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contents. Data suggest that, regarding these types of tasks, children affected 
by autism and ADHD have, in a different way, more difficulties to achieve 
high performances. 
For  a  more  detailed  statistical  analysis,  comparisons  between  two 
groups were made using Student’s t-tests. Results indicated that there are 
statistically significant differences in pragmatic inference task between ASD 
and normally developing children (t= -4.29, p <.001): children with autism 
have  been  found  to  not  use  this  cognitive  ability  more  frequently  than 
control children. While ADHD group showed more difficult than controls in 
providing correct answers to the Colored Progressive Matrices Test (t= -
5.77, p <.001), in understanding of mental states (t= -4.003, p <.05), and in 
pragmatic inference task (t=-7.95, p <.001). Therefore, performances on the 
Object Assembly subtest significantly differed between ADHD children and 
control  group  (t=-6.62,  p  <.001)  and  comparing  the  two  clinical  groups 
(ADHD  vs,  ASD  group)  (t  =  -3.76,  p  <.05),  with  the  ADHD  children 
performing more poorly than other group.  
Finally,  signiﬁcant  positive  correlations  between  the  all  dependent 
variables were found. Table 2 reports Pearson's correlation coefficient of 
examined factors.  
 
Table 2 
Correlations between all dependent variables.  
  CPM  Object Assembly 
Pragmatic inference making  .398 (*)  .526(**) 
Mental states understanding  .671(**)  .567(**) 
**  p < .01 level; *  p < .05 level     
 
Correlational analysis supported the idea of a strong linking among 
different cognitive abilities. Specifically, the results suggest that with the 
increasing  of  intellectual  abilities  also  the  discriminative  and  inferential 
skills improve, and the adequate understanding and attribution processes of 
psychological  states  to  specific  contexts  appear  more  efficient.  This  is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the assessment measures used in this 
study underpin single central coherence ability in integrating environmental 
stimuli, both visual and semantic, into a coherent whole. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
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central coherence between children with high functioning autism, children 
with  ADHD  and  typically  developing  peers.  The  comparisons  between 
participants occurred on central coherence tasks and on ToM tasks, or the 
ability to give meaning and coherence to fragmented elements and attribute 
psychological states according to context analysis.  
Results revealed significant differences in the scores obtained by the 
three groups (ASD, ADHD and TD). Generally, individuals with ASD and 
ADHD exhibited significantly worse performance in all four tests compared 
to  their  typical  developed  peers.  However,  comparing  the  two  clinical 
groups,  perceptual  skills  and  the  ability  to  understand  and  allocate  the 
different  psychological  states  in  specific  contexts  appear  to  be  more 
compromised  in  children  with  ADHD.  Specifically,  the  impulsivity  of 
children  with  ADHD  can  cause  problems  with  control  and  response 
inhibition,  impairing  acquisition  and  development  of  certain  cognitive 
abilities. Increasing latency between the presentation of the stimulus and the 
child's response  might,  however,  facilitate  a  more  quick  learning  process 
and support children with an attention deficit.  
Regarding individuals with ASD, they massively failed the pragmatic 
inference  tasks.  This  finding  confirms  that  basic  visual  and  linguistic 
perceptual functions may be affected in individuals with ASD, and also their 
ability to integrate fragmented stimuli into a coherent whole it has been 
demonstrated to be significantly impaired. 
As already noted, in fact, the unusual perceptual and cognitive style of 
individuals  with  autism  is  characterized  by  an  inability  to  integrate 
information  in  relevant  context,  a  segmented  processing  experience,  an 
inability to experience wholes, and a persistent preoccupation with parts of 
objects’. 
Based  on  these  perceptual  and  cognitive  deficits,  a  “weak  central 
coherence” in children with ASD was confirmed in this study. Specifically, 
in  both  perceptual  and  semantic  tasks,  the  group  with  ASD  scored 
significantly lower than the control group, due to the fact that these patients 
are not able to integrate experience elements in a coherent scene, and hence 
unable to well completed administered tasks.  To meet the complex needs of 
people  with  autism,  it  could  be  useful  design  specific  interventions  for 
coping  central  coherence  deficits.  A  cognitive-rehabilitative  treatment, 
conducted by a professional multidisciplinary team, could achieve results in 
both  the  acquisition  of  more  complex  learning  skills  and  the  social 
competences of children. Specifically, the implementation of special autism 
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intervention,  can  also  enhance  motivation  for  social  interaction  and 
prompting speciﬁc social behavior usually impaired in these patients.   
This  study  expands  upon  research  on  the  role  of  Weak  Central 
Coherence  and  ToM  performances  of  different  clinical  populations  in 
several  ways.  Although  research  has  been  abundant  on  the  impact  of 
specific cognitive impairments, these aspects need to be more examined, 
verifying whether the two different cognitive constructs are related or they 
follow  different  developmental  trajectories.  Past  research  on  WCC  have 
focused  attention  on  the  perceptual  aspects  of  Central  Coherence 
hypothesis, or rather on the role of the ability to collect stimuli from the 
context into a coherent whole. This study expanded upon this perspective by 
measuring the ability to grasp the meaning of the actions taking place in the 
context,  including  additional  forms  of  central  coherence  assessment.  Up 
until  this  time,  no  study  has  examined  ability  to  process  contextual 
information through perceptual organization and semantic inference tasks in 
ASD and ADHD children.  Although the intention of many studies is to 
understand WCC effects on children psychological and social functioning, 
exclusively perceptual tasks have been used to measure this construct in 
clinical samples, with the result that it is often unmeasured or inadequately 
measured. In the current study, perceptual and semantic tasks have been 
introduced  for  evaluating  the  central  coherence  level,  considering  both 
capacities  as  essential  to  the  overall  organization  of  the  context  and  for 
understanding contextual information meaning.  
Another  important  contribution  of  this  study  is  the  comparison  of 
clinical  groups  (ASD  vs  ADHD)  that  show  two  different  attentive 
impairments,  overselectivity  and    impulsivity.  These  specific  cognitive 
functioning can impact in a different way on the ability to organize and 
process information. In addition, this study expanded upon these cognitive 
mechanisms by measuring the ability to use the context for story completion 
task that implies the attribution of mental states to the protagonist of the 
story.  
Despite all this study presents some considerable limitations. First, the 
sample  size  is  small.  This  is  due  to  the  rigidity  of  the  inclusion  criteria 
related  to  determining  characteristics  disorders  taken  into  consideration. 
Second,  the  current  study  was  cross-sectional  in  design  and  its  results 
should  be  interpreted  as  such.  A  longitudinal  study  that  tracks  cognitive 
children development over time would supplement this research by showing 
how changes in central coherence and ToM relate to social functioning over 
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development in the life span. Moreover, the groups were too heterogeneous, 
because it was not possible to control gender variable. Future studies, testing 
potential moderating variables, such as gender, socioeconomic status and 
rehabilitation program, may help provide valuable information for designing 
interventions for certain groups of children. Future work, therefore, may be 
necessary to enlarge the sample and have a better chance of generalization. 
It may also be interesting to see whether training aimed at the modification 
of dysfunctional attentive styles, can produce effects on the ability to use the 
context to process environmental stimuli. 
Nevertheless, this research can be considered a first step towards the 
knowledge and study of the central coherence mechanisms and processes 
involved. It can be a starting point for the formulation of specific treatments 
aimed  to  the  development  of  this  important  capacity  that  regulates  the 
perceptual and semantic mechanisms. The purpose of these training should 
be to promote and improve the cognitive, behavioral and social functioning 
of  these  specific  impaired  patients.    Specifically,  the  inability  to  have  a 
global vision of the stimuli, certainly inhibits many learning behaviors not 
only  for  the  subjects  with  autistic  disorder  but  also  for  children  with 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. 
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